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Abstract. In this chapter we present an application and framework to automate multi-issue bilateral negotiation in e-markets. We address several challenges of a typical negotiation in an online marketplace, such as (i) how to elicit preferences from users; (ii) how to formally represent preferences that at the same time allow human users to express both qualitative and quantitative preferences; (iii) how to compute agreements which are mutual beneficial for both buyer and seller, i.e., outcome enjoying economics properties as Pareto-efficiency. The issue of preference elicitation is addressed with the help of an easy-touse graphical interface hiding all the technicalities of the underlying framework. Preferences are then mapped to a logic language, that allows one to express preferences on both numerical and non-numerical features. We build a utility function on top of this logic language in order to permit the representation of relative importance among preferences, to evaluate the possible agreements and finally choose the one(s) enjoying the Pareto-efficiency property.
Introduction
Negotiation in Multi-Agent System (MAS) has been extensively studied and applied in different and heterogenous fields. Among others we cite: resource allocation problems (e.g. scheduling, logistics, bandwidth usage), e-commerce, and especially online auctions and bilateral negotiation in emarkets. Usually, in e-markets human users elicit their preferences and, based on such preferences, software agents negotiate on their behalf trying to come to the most satisfiable agreement for the users.
In this chapter we present an application based on an underlying theoretical framework to automatically negotiate in e-marketplaces 1 , focusing in particular on three key aspects: (i) preference elicitation from non-expert users through an easy-to-use graphical user interface (UI); (ii) preference representation using a logical language mixed to utility theory to allow users to express both qualitative and quantitative preferences among inter-related issues; (iii) computation of optimal agreements in a framework where preferences are expressed through a logical language. We analyze these issues in a particular case study-namely, the one of automotive e-markets-to ground our approach in a real use case scenario 2 .
In this chapter we address several challenges related to automated negotiation in e-markets, we address the problem of preference elicitation and representation, the challenge of dealing with multi-issues in our negotiation scenario, and the problem of reaching optimal outcomes at the end of the negotiation process. In the following we briefly describe the main issues characterizing each scenario.
Preference elicitation. The problem of preference elicitation from human users is a crucial issue in negotiation: the success of a negotiation, and consequently, the acceptance of a negotiation outcome by human users, mostly depends on this step, as during the negotiation agents choose their strategy based on such elicited preferences. We developed a user-friendly interface that allows users to express preferences on qualitative and quantitative features in a simple and intuitive way and, at the same time, it completely hides all the technicalities to non-expert users. Users can choose and select their preferences in a "search-engine style" way, and for each issue, or composition of issues, express a utility value. 1 Here, we use the terms e-market and e-marketplace interchangeably. 2 We note that such a choice affects neither the theoretical framework nor the application we propose here; indeed they both remain valid within every domain.
Preference representation. Agents need to communicate with each other in order to express not only what they are searching for/offering, but also to express preferences on issues or bundles thereof. A language has to be defined to express product/service descriptions, as well as preferences on issues characterizing the product/service itself, e.g., the buyer can state: (1) "I can spend up to 25000 e for a passenger car only if there is a navigator pack included"; while the seller can provide (2) a "Sedan with a price not less than 23000 e with a GPS system included". How can we determine if there is a negotiation space between them? In order to handle preferences involving numerical features and non-numerical ones, we use (Section 6.3) the logic P(N ) [1] as a communication language: a Propositional Logic endowed with Concrete Domains. So the above preferences can be expressed as (1) PassengerCar ∧ (price ≤ 25000) ∧ NavigatorPack and (2) Sedan∧(price ≥ 23000)∧GPS system, where relations among issues are made explicit in a logical Theory (i.e., an ontology), where we can represent that a Sedan is a type of Passenger car (Sedan ⇒ PassengerCar) or that a Suv is not a Sedan (SUV ⇒ ¬Sedan) or still, find the meaning of Navigator pack (NavigatorPack ⇔ SatelliteAlarm ∧ GPS system). Once preferences have been represented through a logic language it is important to compare them, weighting each agent's preferences. This can be done ranking preferences in an ordinal or cardinal way. Furthermore we are interested not only in local preferences (over logical formulas), but also in global preferences (over entire agreements). Hence, we compare and evaluate different kinds of agreement to find the most suitable agreements for both agents. To this end we define a utility function taking into account how many preferences are satisfied in the final agreement, their relative relevance and how much (for numerical features) each preference is satisfied (see Sections 6.4 and 6.5). Observe that in our framework it is possible to model positive and negative preferences ("I would like a car either black or gray, but not red"), as well as conditional preferences ("I would like leather seats if the car is black") involving both numerical features and non-numerical ones ("If you want a car with satellite alarm you have to wait at least one month") or only numerical ones ("I accept to pay more than 25000e only if there is a warranty spanning more than two years"). Besides we model quantitative preferences; thanks to the weight assigned to each preference it is possible to determine a relative importance among them, rather than only a total 3 .
Multiple issues.
Differently from e-marketplaces dealing with undifferentiated products (commodities as oil, concrete, etc.) or stocks, where only price, time or quantity have to be taken into account, in an e-marketplace also other features have to be considered during the negotiation process. When a potential buyer browses an e-marketplace, she may look for a good (e.g., a car) fulfilling her needs and/or wishes, so that not only the price is relevant, but also warranty or delivery time, as well as look, model, comfort and so on. Usually issues are described as uncorrelated terms, without considering any underlying semantics. Moreover, issues may not be established in advance (before the negotiation starts) as it is usually assumed in many problems of resource and task allocation (see Section 6.8 for an extensive discussion). In our approach, we model a multi-issue bilateral negotiation problem where issues can also be in some way interrelated (e.g., "I would like a station wagon endowed with shadow rear windows if its color is black").
Optimal outcome. Usually, the main target of an agent is to reach a satisfiable agreement in a reasonable amount of communication rounds. Furthermore, knowing if such an agreement is also Pareto-efficient is a matter that can not be left out. In our framework, we propose a one-shot protocol with the intervention of a mediator with a proactive behavior: it collects and stores advertisements (requests and offers), it allows agents to keep preferences and their worth as private information, it solves the optimization problem (Section 6.6) and proposes to each participant a fair Pareto-efficient agreement (see Section 6.6.2) paving the way to the actual transaction 4 . The strategy followed by the players is the following: they reveal their preferences to the mediator and then, once it has computed a solution, they can accept or refuse the proposed agreement; they refuse if they think possible to reach a better agreement looking for another partner, or for a different set of bidding rules. Notice that here we do not consider the influence of the outside options in the negotiation strategy [2] .
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. We first describe the user elicitation process through the UI (Section 6.2), then we show how to represent preferences using the logic language P(N ) (Section 6.3) and how we weight each preference. Preferences can be expressed over either numerical or nonnumerical features (Section 6.5). Finally, we present how to compute optimal outcomes in our framework (Section 6.6), illustrating the entire process with the help of a simple example (Section 6.7). Related work and conclusion close the chapter.
Preference elicitation
We believe that an effective user interface must separate how we use something from how it is implemented. Often, complex tasks require complex interfaces that are hardly usable by the end-user.
A UI designer has to make the interface attractive, reducing the complexity of interaction and making it as simple as possible to use. There is a trade-off between richness of features offered by the interface and ease of use.
In the current Web, one of the most attractive lands for developing new interfaces is Search. The Web is full of interfaces addressing the problem of composing complex queries. Usually, the user may interact with the UI of a search service in two different ways: (i) express simple queries (often represented by a plain text field), (ii) pose more complex queries (often by filling in tedious forms). Concerning standard/simple interfaces, end-users are used to interact with text input fields where to type free text. Mainly due to its simplicity and effectiveness, such an interface has been successfully adopted by all the search engines. The main drawback of this approach is clear: it is very difficult, sometimes impossible, to formulate complex queries just via free text. For instance, focusing on the automotive domain, how could a user model a simple query like "I'd like either a coupe or a convertible, but I'd prefer the coupe"? If the system accepted just free text with Boolean operators, one could just type "coupe OR convertible", without explicitly stating the fact that the user would prefer rather a coupé than a convertible. Such interfaces are not sufficient to express queries as trivial as the one in the example.
The extensive work in negotiation in multi-agent systems has often offered complex theoretical framework to automate negotiation, neglecting the focus on UIs. They usually do not care about the end-user, assuming that either a formal query is already available or that the user has to express the query by an appropriate formal language. However, in our opinion, innovation in this domain cannot disregard the way users interact with the system. Therefore a winning negotiation application is the one that while hiding its complexity to the end-user can offer more than a simple plain text field; in other words a system which is easy-to-use and at the same time effective. Indeed, welldesigned interfaces allow users to use a system more easily by reducing the learning effort [3] . Moreover, Perkins et al. [4] have shown that computermediated interaction conducts to better negotiation outcomes, with higher joint gains and more balanced contracts, reducing the negotiation time. However, as Lee et al. [3] notice almost none explore Negotiation Support System (NSS) from the perspective of user acceptance 5 .
The UI of the marketplace we propose here was built keeping in mind these principles. Some sketches of the web interfaceare depicted in Figures  6.1, 6 .2 and 6.3. We decided to develop a Web application for automated negotiation in the domain of cars, since this domain presents many interrelated issues to negotiate on and the issues are on both qualitative and quantitative characteristics. We want to stress that although the on-line Web application is focused on the automotive domain, the proposed approach and the principles behind the design of the user interface are domain independent. On the Web, we may find several car portals offering to private customers, car dealers and other partners a platform for trading cars on the Internet, just to cite a few, AutoScout24 6 , AutoTrader 7 , ebayMotors 8 . Even if they are not NSS, however they can be taken as examples of the most common interfaces the user interacts with. The search interface they offer is usually composed by a list (that may be quite big depending of the facets of the search) of select and checkbox fields such as the one proposed by AutoScout 9 . Here a user cannot easily specify the features of the car of her dreams. For example, she cannot communicate with the interface that in her dreams there is no place for a "white car", or she cannot say that she dreams about a car with "black exteriors AND beige leather seats OR silver exteriors AND black seats". Also, she cannot express that she would like primarily a "red Ferrari", but even if it was "yellow" she might be satisfied as well.
The interface we propose here tries to overcome these issues keeping the easiness of using a plain text field while the user expresses her preferences. The entry point to our system is just a field where the user starts to type her query (see (1) in Fig. 6 .1). In this step, the user is supported by an autocompletion functionality that exploits an underlying ontology. For example, if she wanted to select a Convertible, she could just type some characters to see the available choices (see Fig. 6 .2) as modeled in the ontology. Alternatively, the user could also click on the icon on the left of the text field (marked as (2) in Fig. 6 .1) to browse all the items in the background ontology. Thanks to this solution, the interface allows the user both to type and to navigate among resources in the knowledge domain.
Concerning the visualization of the ontology (see Fig. 6 .2), after some usability tests with real users we observed that they preferred a hierarchical representation with just one level of nesting. For example, even if Methane is a subclass of Gasoline and for this reason it should be nested below it, it is more comfortable for the end-user to find Methane below the same top category of Gasoline, i.e., Fuel type. Following this idea, even if the ontology is modeled with the right nesting in order to ensure appropriate reasoning (see Section 6.3), its complexity is hidden to the user who will just see the main categorizations (e.g., Body style, Fuel type, Exterior color) with the corresponding options grouped together below them.
The user may represent her preferences by selecting the features of the car she is looking for from the ontology. This process can be compared to a simple search, where she can formulate her request through simple keywords. In this case, all the features she selects have the same importance/weight, i.e., no particular preferences or combinations are expressed. From this point of view, the perception for the end-user is the same as any other vertical search engine. Indeed, the dynamic generation of the user interface from the ontology as well as the semantics associated to each item is completely hidden to the user. Nevertheless, the same interface allows users to express preferences more complex than just a set of uncorrelated issues. In fact, a user can easily model her preferences, express negative preferences, combine multiple features together, prepare a detailed request without switching to another interface. More precisely, a preference (formula) can be composed either by a single feature or by a set of features in disjunction or conjunction, and the weight of a formula (preference) can be specified through the slider associated to it. If the user moves the cursor over a formula, a slider is shown, as marked by (1) in Fig. 6.3 . Dragging the handle of the slider, it is possible to enhance or reduce the importance of the corresponding formula, e.g., referring to Fig. 6 .3, the user has expressed for (Coupe AND Gasoline) AND (Black OR Red) a stronger preference than for SUV AND Diesel AND NOT White. The font size in which a formula is shown reflects the importance the user has assigned to that preference. Thanks to this solution, the user has a more immediate visual overview of the relative importance of her preferences. This is more evident when the number of formulas gets bigger: in this case using a numeric value next to each formula or a star-rating system would not help her so much to get a prompt idea of the preferences she has conveyed.
For numerical features, such as Price, Capacity, etc., if the user wants to specify a range, she can move the handles in the corresponding slider (see (2) in Fig. 6.3 ). The minimum, maximum and default values are specified in the The web interface with a prototype query ontology. Also expressing negative preferences is simply a matter of clicking on the feature you want to exclude explicitly from your query. In this case a NOT appears before the resource you click on, as shown by (3) in Fig. 6 .3. To remove a previously added feature from the query, the user may click on the × icon that appears next to that feature when she moves the mouse over it (see (4) in Fig. 6.3) .
Complex preferences may be expressed, using the same interface, as a combination of simple preferences represented by a single issue (both positive and negated ones) via drag'n'drop operations. In particular one can represent a complex formula (preference) in two ways:
• drag a simple preference and drop it on another one you want to group with; • drag a complex preference (formula) and drop it on another formula.
Referring to Fig. 6 .3, the formula SUV AND Diesel AND NOT White has been obtained by three easy steps:
1. choose the three distinct concepts SUV, Diesel and White; 2. drag and drop the last two on the first one; 3. click on White to add a negation.
Once the user represents a complex preference, she can assign a global importance/value to the whole formula instead of being forced to assign a single utility value to each single issue. Generally speaking, if she drags a complex formula, using the handle indicated by (5) in Fig. 6 .3, and drops it on another formula, she may group two or more preferences and assign a global preference value to their composition. In Fig. 6.3 , we see how the two formulas Coupe AND Gasoline and Black OR Red have been grouped in a single complex preference. To switch all the Boolean operators in a subformula from AND to OR and vice-versa, the user has just to click on one of the operators. After some usability tests with real users, we decided to allow the use of only one kind of operator in each row. For example the user cannot represent, on the same line, Coupe AND Gasoline AND Black OR Red. To write such formula she has to use two lines-where each line corresponds to a sub-formula-one for Coupe AND Gasoline and one for Black OR Red. In fact, the users who tested the system were confused by the priority of Boolean operators: they do not know that AND has a higher priority than OR. If a user wrote Coupe AND Gasoline AND Black OR Red, meaning (Coupe AND Gasoline) AND (Black OR Red), actually the system would interpret it as (Coupe AND Gasoline AND Black) OR Red, and that would lead to different results with respect to the ones expected by the user. In support of the above choice, in [5] the authors show that interfaces that allow end-users to freely use logical operators and modifiers induce them to make mistakes in more than 50% of cases. On the contrary, with the interface we propose here, while still having the ability of using operators, we strongly reduce the possibility of making mistakes.
Preference representation: the language P(N )
Here, we describe how we represent preferences on both numerical and nonnumerical issues using the logic language P(N ). We divide issues involved in a negotiation into two categories. Some issues may express properties that are true or false, like, e.g., in an automotive domain, ItalianMaker, or AlarmSystem. We represent them as propositional atoms A 1 , A 2 , . . . from a finite set A. Other issues involve numerical features like deliverytime, or price represented as variables f 1 , f 2 , . . ., each one with its specific domain
. ., such as [0, 90] (days) for deliverytime, or [1000, 30000] (euros), for price. The variables representing numerical features are always constrained by comparing them to some constant, like price < 20000, or deliverytime ≥ 30, and such constraints can be combined into complex propositional requirements-also involving propositional issuese.g., ItalianMaker ∧ (price ≤ 25000) ∧ (deliverytime < 30) (representing a car made in Italy, costing no more than 25000 euros, delivered in less than 30 days), or AlarmSystem ⇒ (deliverytime > 30) (expressing the seller's requirement"if you want an alarm system mounted you'll have to wait more than one month"). We now give precise definitions for the above intuitions, borrowing from a previous formalization of so-called concrete domains [6] from Knowledge Representation languages. For our numerical features, predicates are always the binary operators C(D) = {≥, ≤}, whose second argument is a constant in ∆ c (D) 10 . Now we formally extend propositional logic in order to handle numerical features and define the language P(N ).
Definition 6.2 (The language P(N )) Let A be a set of propositional atoms, and F a set of pairs f, D f each made of a feature name and an associated concrete domain D f , and let k be a value in D f . Then the following formulas are in P(N ):
1. every atom A ∈ A is a formula in P(N )
, and c ∈ {≥, ≤, >, <, =, =} then (f ck) is a formula in P(N )
3. if ψ and ϕ are formulas in P(N ) then ¬ψ, ψ ∧ ϕ are formulas in P(N ). We also use ψ ∨ ϕ as an abbreviation for ¬(¬ψ ∧ ¬ϕ), ψ ⇒ ϕ as an abbreviation for ¬ψ ∨ ϕ, and ψ ⇔ ϕ as an abbreviation for
We call L A,F the set of formulas in P(N ) built using A and F .
In order to define a formal semantics of P(N ) formulas, we consider interpretation functions I that map propositional atoms into {true, false}, feature names into values in their domain, and assign propositional values to numerical constraints and composite formulas according to the intended semantics.
Definition 6.3 (Interpretation and models) An interpretation I for P(N ) is a function (denoted as a superscript · I on its argument) that maps each atom in A into a truth value A I ∈ {true, false}, each feature name f into a value f I ∈ D f , and assigns truth values to formulas as follows:
• (¬ψ) I = true iff ψ I = false, (ψ ∧ ϕ) I = true iff both ψ I = true and ϕ I = true, according to truth tables for propositional connectives.
Given a formula ϕ in P(N ), we denote with I |= ϕ the fact that I assigns true to ϕ. If I |= ϕ we say I is a model for ϕ, and I is a model for a set of formulas when it is a model for each formula.
An interpretation I is completely defined by the values it assigns to propositional atoms and numerical features. Given a set of formulas T in P(N ) (representing an ontology), we denote by I |= T the fact that I is a model for T . An ontology is satisfiable if it has a model. T logically implies a formula ϕ, denoted by T |= ϕ iff ϕ is true in all models of T . We denote by M T = {I 1 , . . . ,I n }, the set of all models for T , and omit the subscript when no confusion arises.
The following remarks apply to the concrete domains of our e-marketplaceoriented scenarios:
1. domains are discrete, with a uniform discretization step . For each numerical feature, the discretization step , max(D f ) and min(D f ) depend on the marketplace, that is they depend on the specific domain, they are encoded in the system and are the same for all agents. This means for example that for the feature price the value of in a marketplace of pizzas may be different from the value in a car marketplace.
Definition 6.4 (successor/predecessor) Given two contiguous elements k i and k i+1 in a concrete domain D f we denote by:
Clearly, max(D f ) has no successor and min(D f ) has no predecessor.
A logic-based framework for multi-issue negotiation
According to Ragone et al. [7] , we use logic formulas in P(N ) to model the buyer's demand and the seller's supply. Relations among issues, both propositional and numerical, are represented by a set T -for Theory (i.e., ontology)-of P(N ) formulas. Both the demand and the supply are split into two separate set of requirements: strict ones (must be in the final agreement) and preferences (the user is willing to negotiate on them). In a typical bilateral negotiation scenario, statements within both the buyer's request and the seller's offer can be split into strict requirements and preferences. Strict requirements represent what the buyer and the seller want to be necessarily satisfied in order to accept the final agreement-in our framework we call strict requirements demand/supply. Preferences are statements involving issues they are willing to negotiate on: preferences may not be satisfied in the final agreement; obviously, the more preferences are fulfilled in the final agreement, the more an agent will be satisfied. • a buyer's demand is a formula β (for Buyer) in P(N ) such that T ∪ {β} is satisfiable.
• a seller's supply is a formula σ (for Seller) in P(N ) such that T ∪ {σ} is satisfiable.
• I is a possible deal between β and σ iff I |= T ∪ {σ, β}, that is, I is a model for T , σ, and β. We also call I an agreement.
The seller and the buyer model in σ and β the minimal requirements they accept for the negotiation. If seller and buyer have set strict attributes that are in conflict with each other, that is M T ∪{σ,β} = ∅, the negotiation ends immediately because it is impossible to reach an agreement. If the participants are willing to avoid the conflict deal [8] , and continue the negotiation, it will be necessary they revise their strict requirements. In the negotiation process both the buyer and the seller express some preferences on attributes, or their combination. The utility function is usually defined based on these preferences. We start defining buyer's and seller's preferences and their associated utilities: u β for the buyer, and u σ for the seller. Definition 6.6 (Preferences) The buyer's negotiation preferences B . = {β 1 , . . . ,β k } are a set of formulas in P(N ), each of them representing the subject of a buyer's preference, and a utility function u β : B → Q + assigning a utility to each formula, such that i u β (β i ) = 1. Analogously, the seller's negotiation preferences S . = {σ 1 , . . . ,σ h } are a set of formulas in P(N ), each of them representing the subject of a seller's preference, and a utility function u σ : S → Q + assigning a utility to each formula, such that j u σ (σ j ) = 1. Definition 6.7 (Preference Utilities) Let B and S be respectively the buyer's and seller's preferences, and M T ∪{σ,β} be their agreements set. The preference utility of an agreement I ∈ M T ∪{σ,β} for a buyer and a seller, respectively, are defined as:
where Σ{. . .} stands for the sum of all elements in the set.
Notice that if one agent e.g., the buyer, does not specify soft preferences, but only strict requirements, this is modeled as β 1 = true and u β,P(N ) (I) = 1, which reflects the fact that an agent accepts whatever agreement not in conflict with its strict requirements. Expressing a strict requirement on numerical features is equivalent to setting a reservation value [9] on them. Both buyer and seller have their own reservation values on each feature involved in the negotiation process. It is the maximum (or minimum) value in the range of possible feature values to reach an agreement, e.g., the maximum price the buyer wants to pay for a car or the minimum warranty required, as well as, from the seller's perspective the minimum price she will accept to sell the car or the minimum delivery time. Usually, each participant knows its own reservation value and ignores the opponent's one. Referring to price and the two corresponding reservation values r β,price and r σ,price for the buyer and the seller respectively, if the buyer expresses price ≤ r β,price and the seller price ≥ r σ,price , in case r σ,price ≤ r β,price we have [r σ,price , r β,price ] as a Zone Of Possible Agreement -ZOP A(price), otherwise no agreement is possible [9] . More formally, given an agreement I and a feature f , f I ∈ ZOP A(f ) must hold.
Obviously, the reservation value is considered as private information and will not be revealed to the other party, but will be taken into account by the mediator when the agreement will be computed. Since setting a reservation value on a numerical feature is equivalent to set a strict requirement, then, once the buyer and the seller express their strict requirements, reservation values constraints have to be added to them.
In order to formally define a Multi-issue Bilateral Negotiation problem in P(N ), the only other elements we still need to introduce are the disagreement thresholds, also called disagreement payoffs, t β , t σ . Definition 6.8 (MBN-P(N )) Given a P(N ) set of axioms T , a demand β and a set of buyer's preferences B with utility function u β,P(N ) and a disagreement threshold t β , a supply σ and a set of seller's preferences S with utility function u σ,P(N ) and a disagreement threshold t σ , a Multi-issue Bilateral Negotiation problem (MBN) is finding a model I (agreement) such that all the following conditions hold:
Observe that not every agreement I is a solution of an MBN, if either u σ,P(N ) (I) < t σ or u β,P(N ) (I) < t β . Such an agreement represents a deal which, although satisfying strict requirements, is not worth the transaction effort. Also notice that, since reservation values on numerical features are modeled in β and σ as strict requirements, for each feature f , the condition f I ∈ ZOP A(f ) always holds by condition (6.1).
Utilities for Numerical Features
Buyer's/seller's preferences are used to evaluate how good is a possible agreement and to select the best one. preferences on numerical features are also considered, in order to evaluate agreements and how good an agreement is w.r.t. another one. Of course, for each feature two utility functions are needed; one for the buyer -u β,f , the other for the seller -u σ,f . These functions have to satisfy at least the basic properties enumerated below. For the sake of conciseness, we write u f when the same property holds both for u β,f and u σ,f . :
1. u f is normalized to [0, 1] to make agents' preferences comparable and to avoid that agents could manipulate their preference revelation in order to get a better deal stating a bigger (or smaller) number of preferences. Given the pair f, D f , it must be defined over the domain D f .
2. u f has to be monotonic and whenever u β,f increases then u σ,f decreases and vice versa.
3. There is no utility for the buyer if the agreed value on price is greater or equal than its reservation value and there is no utility for the seller if the price is less than or equal to its reservation value. Since concrete domains are finite, for the buyer the best possible price is min(D price ) whilst for the seller is max(D price ). The contrary holds if we refer to year warranty. 
Given a buyer and a seller, if u β,f increases then u σ,f decreases and vice versa.
The simplest utility functions are the two linear functions:
if it monotonically increases and
if it monotonically decreases (see Figure 6 .4).
Computing Optimal Outcomes in P(N )
Among all possible agreements that we can compute, given an ontology T as constraint, we are interested in agreements that are Pareto-efficient. Among them, we are interested on the ones either maximizing the sum of utilities-maximum welfare-or maximizing their product-Nash-bargaining solution [10] . We now outline how an actual solution can be found solving an optimization problem.
Objective functions
Here we define functions to be maximized to find a solution to an optimization problem.
First of all, we introduce a set of fresh propositional atoms w.r.t. to the ones in A (see Definition 6.2) and a new set of equivalence axioms to T . Let:
• {B 1 , . . . ,B k , S 1 , . . . ,S h } be k + h new propositional atoms different from the ones in A;
In order to formulate functions to be maximized involving preferences expressed as formulas in P(N ), let {b 1 , . . . ,b k } binary variables one-one with {B 1 , . . . ,B k } and similarly {s 1 , . . . ,s h } for {S 1 , . . . ,S h }. The functions representing respectively buyer's and seller's utility over preferences can hence be defined as:
where, given an agreement I,
For each feature f involved in the negotiation process we have a feature utility function for the buyer u β,f and one for the seller u σ,f . For instance, if we consider price and the linear function in equations (6.7) and (6.6) we likely will have:
The Optimization Problem
In order to find a Pareto agreement between the traders, we have to define global utility functions that take into account all their objective functions (both their preference utility functions and their feature utility functions).
where n is the cardinality of F , i.e., the number of concrete features involved in the negotiation process.
Definition 6.10 Given a MBN-P(N ), we define MAX-SUM-MBN-P (N ) as the problem of finding an agreement I for which u G σ (I) + u G β (I) is maximal and MAX-PROD-MBN-P (N ) the problem of finding an agreement I for which u G σ (I) · u G β (I) is maximal.
Clearly, every solution for MAX-SUM-MBN-P (N ) and MAX-PROD-MBN-P(N ) is also a Pareto agreement, but not vice versa [11] . In addition to the set of functions to maximize, in our setting, we have three different sets of constraints:
1. the (modified) ontology T -see the beginning of Section 6.6
2. strict requirements β and σ, including reservation values over numerical features 3. conditions (6.2) and (6.3) of an MBN on disagreement thresholds t β and t σ -see the definition of MBN-P(N ) at the end of Section 6.4
Notice that the constraints involving disagreements thresholds are already linear ones. In order to model as linear constraints also the ones described in points 1 and 2 of the above enumeration, we proceed as follows.
Clause reduction. Obtain a set of clauses T s.t. each clause contains only one single numerical constraint and T is satisfiable iff T ∪ {σ, β} does. In order to have such clauses, if after using standard transformations in clausal form [12] you find a clause with two numerical constraints χ : A∨. . . (f i c i k i )∨ (f j c j k j ) pick up a new propositional atom A and replace χ with the set of two clauses 11
As a final step, for each clause, replace
Encoding clauses into linear inequalities. We use a modified version of wellknown encoding of clauses into linear inequalities (e.g., [14, p.314 • map each propositional atom A occurring in a clause χ with a binary variable a. If A occurs negated in χ then substitute ¬A with (1 − a), otherwise substitute A with a.
• replace (f ≤ k) with
After this rewriting it is easy to see that, considering ∨-logical oras classical addition, in order to have a clause true the evaluation of the corresponding expression must be a value grater or equal to 1. Notice that the above encoding of the constraints involved in the negotiation process as well as the definition of MAX-SUM-MBN-P (N ) and MAX-PROD-MBN-P (N ) are not depending from how u G β and u G σ are formalized.
If both u G β and u G σ are a linear combination of the preference and feature utility functions, i.e., a weigthed sum of u P(N ) , u f 1 , ..., u fn normalized to 1, then MAX-SUM-MBN-P (N ) remains linear while MAX-PROD-MBN-P (N ) is quadratic [15] .
The Negotiation process
Summing up, the negotiation process covers the following steps:
Preliminary Phase. The buyer defines strict β and preferences B with corresponding utilities u β (β i ) , as well as the threshold t β , and similarly the seller σ, S, u σ (σ j ) and t σ . Here we are not interested in how to compute t β ,t σ , and the weight of each preference; we assume they are determined in advance by means of either direct assignment methods (Ordering, Simple Assessing or Ratio Comparison) or pairwise comparison methods (like AHP and Geometric Mean) [16] . Both agents inform the mediator about these specifications and the ontology T they refer to. Obviously, the mediator is a trustable agent as negotiating agents have to reveal to it their private information. Notice that for each feature involved in the negotiation process, both in β and σ their respective reservation values are set either in the form f ≤ r f or in the form f ≥ r f .
Consider the example referring to the automotive e-marketplace, where buyer and seller specify respectively their strict requirements β and σ, thresholds t β and t σ , preferences and the worth thereof as in the following: Let T be the ontology in P(N ), which the participants refer to:
Negotiation-Core phase. For each β i ∈ B the mediator picks up a new propositional atom B i and adds the axiom B 1 ⇔ β i to T , similarly for S. Then, it transforms all the constraints modeled in β, σ and (just extended) T in the corresponding linear inequalities following the procedures illustrated in Section 6.6.2. Given the preference utility functions u β,P(N ) (I) = k i=1 b i u β (β i ) and u σ,P(N ) (I) = h j=1 s j u σ (σ j ), the mediator adds to this set of constraints the ones involving disagreement thresholds u β,P(N ) ≥ t β and u σ,P(N ) ≥ t σ .
With respect to the above set of constraints, the mediator solves an optimization problem maximizing the sum (or the product) of global utilities for both buyer u G β (I) and seller u G σ (I). The returned solution to the optimization problem is the agreement proposed to the buyer and the seller. Notice that this solution is a Pareto optimal one, furthermore the solution proposed by the mediator is also a fair solution, if among all the Pareto-optimal solutions we take the one maximizing the product of utilities of both the buyer and the seller (see Section 6.6.2).
With reference to the previous example the mediator proposes the following agreement to the players. We omit for the sake of conciseness propositional atoms interpreted as false, then the final agreement is:
I : {Sedan I = true, ExternalColorGray I = true, SatelliteAlarm I = true, GPS system I = true, NavigatorPack I = true, AlarmSystem I = true, price I = 28000, km warranty I = 160000, year warranty I = 5}
From this point on, it is a take-it-or-leave-it offer, as the participants can either accept or reject the proposed agreement [17] . This is a decision taken by the humans rather than by the agents acting on their behalf.
Related work
Automated negotiation has been widely investigated by researchers from both the economics community and from the artificial intelligence one. Therefore this section is necessarily far from complete. In the following we give a brief overview of logic-based approaches to automated negotiation, comparing our approach with existing ones and highlighting relevant differences.
There is a huge amount of literature focused on argumentationbased negotiation [18, 19, 20, 21] . In these approaches an agent can accept/reject/critique a proposal of its opponent, so agents can argue about their beliefs, given their desires and so pursue their intentions [19] . With respect to our framework, these approaches require a richer communication language (e.g., modal logic) in order to exchange information and a specific negotiation protocol to constrain the use of the language. While we use a oneshot protocol with the presence of a mediator, which ensures the termination after only one round, in argumentation-based frameworks, usually, agent interactions go back and forth for multiple rounds, without the intervention of a third party. Moreover agents have to be able not only to evaluate opponent proposals or possible agreements, but also generate a critique or a counterproposal, given the opponent's one. With references to BDI approaches proposed by Parsons et al. [19] , Desires and Intentions match in our framework with Preferences, and Beliefs are implicit in each agent: the agent enters the e-marketplace because she believes there will be another agent having what she is searching for.
Several recent logic-based approaches to negotiation are based on propositional logic. Bouveret et al. [22] use Weighted Propositional Formulas (WPF) to express agents preferences in the allocation of indivisible goods, but no common knowledge (as our ontology) is present. The use of an ontology allows e.g., to catch inconsistencies between demand and supply or find out if an agent preference is implied by a preference of its opponent, which is fundamental to model an e-marketplace. Chevaleyre et al. [23] classify utility functions expressed through WPF according to the properties of the utility function (sub/super-additive, monotone, etc.). We used the most expressive functions according to that classification, namely, weights over unrestricted propositional formulas.
Zhang and Zhang [24] adopt a kind of propositional knowledge base arbitration to choose a fair negotiation outcome. However, common knowledge is considered as just more entrenched preferences, that could be even dropped in some deals. Instead, the logical constraints in our ontology T must always be enforced in the negotiation outcomes. Finally we devised a protocol which the agents should adhere to while negotiating; in contrast, Zhang and Zhang [24] adopt a game-theoretic approach, presenting no protocol at all, since communication between agents is not considered.
We borrow from Wooldridge and Parsons [25] the definition of agreement as a model for a set of formulas from both agents. However, Wooldridge and Parsons [25] only study multiple-rounds protocols and the approach leaves the burden to reach an agreement to the agents themselves, although they can follow a protocol. The approach does not take preferences into account, so that it is not possible to guarantee the reached agreement is Pareto-efficient. Our approach, instead, aims at giving an automated support to negotiating agents to reach, in one shot, Pareto agreements. The work presented here builds on the work by Ragone et al. [26] , where a basic propositional logic framework endowed of a logical theory was proposed. Afterward Ragone et al. [7] extend the approach also discussing complexity issues. In this chapter we further extended the framework, introducing the extended logic P(N ), thus handling numerical features, and showed we are able to compute Paretoefficient agreements, by solving an optimization problem and adopting a oneshot negotiation protocol.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented an online application for automated negotiation in e-marketplaces. The machinery behind the application bases on a formal framework that maps user preferences, elicited thanks to a userfriendly UI, to a logic language to represent constraints among numerical and non-numerical issues. Users elicit their preferences through the graphical interface in a "search-engine-style way" selecting and then combining issues (with disjunction or conjunction) and giving to single issues or bundle of them a different importance (utility). Preferences are then translated to weighted logical formulas in P(N ).
Based on agents' preferences, the system computes the outcomes of the negotiation process enjoying the Pareto-efficiency property. The mediator proposes such agreements to the agents that can accept one of them or opt out of the negotiation. 
